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CONTRACT LAW AND THE COMMON GOOD
BRIAN H. BIX
ABSTRACT
In The Dignity of Commerce, Nathan Oman offers a theory
of contract law that is largely descriptive, but also strongly normative. His theory presents contract law’s purpose as supporting robust
markets. This Article compares and contrasts Oman’s argument
about the proper understanding of contract law with one presented
over eighty years earlier by Morris Cohen. Oman’s focus is on the
connection between Contract Law and markets; Cohen’s connection
had been between Contract Law and the public interest. Oman’s
work brings back Cohen’s basic insight, and gives it a more concrete
form, as a formidable normative theory with detailed prescriptions.

Frederick W. Thomas Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of
Minnesota. This Paper was presented at the Symposium, “Markets and the
Moral Foundations of Contract Law,” William and Mary Law School, April
2017. I am grateful for the comments and suggestions of the participants at
the Symposium.
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INTRODUCTION
In The Dignity of Commerce, Nathan Oman offers a theory
of contract law that is largely descriptive, but also strongly normative.1 His theory presents contract law’s purpose as supporting
robust markets.2 This Article compares and contrasts Oman’s
argument about the proper understanding of contract law with
one presented over eighty years earlier by Morris Cohen, another
theory that focused on what contract law should do for us.
Part I summarizes Cohen’s argument. Part II compares
Oman’s analysis with Cohen’s, to see where the newer work improves on the older, and where the older work might still have
some advantages.
I. MORRIS COHEN’S “BASIS OF CONTRACT”
In 1933, Morris Cohen published “The Basis of Contract”
in the Harvard Law Review.3 Cohen’s article is a nice match to
Oman’s book, in scope, ambition, and learning. Cohen’s purpose
was to investigate the “nature of contract” in the light of moral
philosophy, general social philosophy, political theory, and economics.4 As in Oman’s book, the text travels among both historical lands and historians (Maine, Maitland, and Montesquieu; and
Homeric Greece, Biblical Israel, and medieval Italy, just to name
a few).5 From the historical survey, the author draws two conclusions: (1) that Maine’s famous observation that law moves from
status to contract is “partly true in certain periods of expanding
trade;”6 and (2) “[a]t no times does a community completely abdicate its right to limit and regulate the effect of private agreements,
a right that it must exercise to safeguard what it regards as the
interest of all its members.”7 In the course of his analysis, Cohen
also touches on the theme Oman will emphasize at much greater
NATHAN B. OMAN, THE DIGNITY OF COMMERCE: MARKETS AND THE MORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 1 (2016) [hereinafter OMAN, DIGNITY].
2 Id.
3 Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933).
4 Id. at 553.
5 Id. at 554–58, 574–75.
6 Id. at 558.
7 Id. at 558 (emphasis in original).
1
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length: that commerce and international trade are central to the
“expansion of the régime of contract.”8
In the course of his analysis, Cohen considered a prominent theory of contract that corresponds to the autonomy theory
that Oman considers and rejects:9 the will theory of contracts.10
In the United States (unlike Continental Europe),11 the will theory of contracts had become enmeshed with the partly economic,
partly political theory of laissez-faire.12 So, the article argues on
two fronts, against both the will theory13 and laissez-faire.14 As to
the latter, Cohen found a troubling inconsistency in the advocates of non-intervention: “[t]he same group ... that protests against
a child labor law, or against any minimum wage law ... is constantly urging the government to protect industry by tariffs.”15
Another older variant of a recent theory of Contract Law appears in
Cohen’s critique of reliance theories of Contract Law.16
In the context of his discussion of laissez-faire approaches to
Contract Law, Cohen rejected John Stuart Mill’s drawing of a sharp
line between self-regarding actions and other-regarding actions:
“[w]hat act of any individual does not affect others?”17 This in
turn leads to what is, arguably, the central point of Cohen’s article:
A contract ... between two or more individuals cannot be said
to be generally devoid of all public interest. If it be of no interest, why enforce it? For note that in enforcing contracts, the
government does not merely allow two individuals to do what they
have found pleasant in their eyes. Enforcement ... puts the
Id. at 557.
OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 8–9; cf. Nathan B. Oman, Consent to Retaliation: A Civil Recourse Theory of Contractual Liability, 96 IOWA L. REV.
529 (2011) (arguing for superiority of a civil recourse approach to contract law
over autonomy-based approaches).
10 See generally Cohen, supra note 3, at 558–62, 575–78; JAMES GORDLEY,
THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE 161–229 (1991)
(discussing the will theory).
11 See GORDLEY, supra note 10, at 161–229.
12 See Cohen, supra note 3, at 558–62.
13 Id. at 575–78.
14 Id. at 560, 562.
15 Id. at 561–62.
16 See id. at 578–80. For modern versions of the reliance theory, see GRANT
GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 61–63 (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., 1995), &
P. S. ATIYAH, ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 87 (Repr., with a new chapter, 1990).
17 Cohen, supra note 3, at 562.
8
9

2018]

CONTRACT LAW AND THE COMMON GOOD

377

machinery of the law in the service of one party against the
other. When that is worthwhile and how that should be done
are important questions of public policy. ... [T]he notion that in
enforcing contracts the state is only giving effect to the will of
the parties rests upon an utterly untenable theory as to what
the enforcement of contracts involves.18

After a circuit of other theories of Contract Law prominent
in his day, Cohen returns to his main theme: “[i]f ... the law of
contract confers sovereignty on one party over another (by putting the state’s forces at the disposal of the former) ... [f]or what
purposes and under what circumstances shall that power be
conferred?”19 Sometimes, he considered, limits on available terms
(e.g., usury laws and non-enforcement of unconscionable terms)
or mandatory terms may be what public policy requires.20
Cohen’s ultimate conclusion is straightforward: the provision of courts and other enforcement machinery to respond to
breaches of contract is an expensive resource.21 It is reasonable
that the state should only provide this resource where enforcement
of contracts serves the public interest and withhold this resource
for those particular contracts, or categories of contracts, where
enforcement would not serve the public interest.22 The question
of social good is foundational under this analysis. Echoing—though
not citing—David Hume, Cohen argues that the only reason we
have to keep promises and agreements earlier made is “some
social good or necessity that is served.”23
Both the weakness and the strength of Cohen’s argument is
its flexibility. “Enforce what serves the common good” seems as
uncontroversial, and as helpful to practical judgment as the prescription “be fair” and “do justice”24 (or, for that matter, Aquinas’s
Id.
Id. at 587.
20 Id. at 587–88.
21 Id. at 586–87.
22 Id. at 587.
23 Id. at 571; cf. David Hume, Of the Original Contract (1752), reprinted in
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 49–51 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2000),
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch2s4.html [https://perma
.cc/P9TV-RYET] (arguing that the legitimacy of “social contracts,” like the moral
obligation to keep promises or contracts generally, is ultimately grounded on
whether they serve the general welfare).
24 Cohen, supra note 3, at 571.
18
19
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prescription “that good should be done and sought and evil is to
be avoided”).25 We want to know what types of agreements do
serve the public interest, and thus warrant enforcement, and we
would prefer, to the extent possible, to know this in advance to give
greater predictability (and consistency) to enforcement decisions.26
Cohen does not deny or disregard this.27 In the course of an article that already deals (briskly) with a large number of topics and
approaches, Cohen is more than willing to share his views about
government regulation in general, minimum wages, usury laws,
mandatory terms in employment and insurance contracts, and
many other topics.28 By way of summation, he adds: “[f]or our
present purpose it is sufficient to note that the law of contract in
thus dealing with public policies cannot be independent of general
political theory.”29
II. THE DIGNITY OF COMMERCE
A. Overview
Oman’s argument in The Dignity of Commerce is, essentially, a market theory of contract.30 He declares: “well-functioning
markets are morally desirable, and contract law should be organized to support such markets.”31 That is, contracts should be
enforced when they support (well-functioning, non-pernicious) markets, and not enforced when they do not.32
Markets are valuable, Oman argues, because they produce
prosperity, encourage “peaceful cooperation in a pluralistic society
and inculcate certain moral virtues.”33 While Oman finds indications of connections between contract law and markets in some of
the American legal realists’ work,34 in aspects of law and economics
THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I–II, Question 94, art. 2, corpus,
in ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, THE TREATISE ON LAW 247 (R. J. Henle ed., 1993).
26 Cohen, supra note 3, at 587–88.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 561–62, 587–88.
29 Id. at 588.
30 OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 1, 183–84.
31 Id. at 1.
32 Id. at 16–17, 160–61.
33 Id. at 16.
34 Id. at 13–14.
25
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scholarship,35 and in some other contemporary Contract Law theories,36 he concludes that none of the Contract Law theories make
markets sufficiently central.37
Anglo-American contract law predates the rise of modern
markets—though, of course, commercial exchange has been around
longer still, there is no reason to think that the enforcement of
promises or exchanges predates it.38 Of course, Oman, well-read in
the history of Contract Law, recognizes this. He observes that
“[n]othing as complicated and as historically contingent as the common law of contracts can be said to have a simple origin or represent a single normative concern over the centuries of its history.”39
B. Two Case Examples
For all the strengths of Oman’s analysis, I would have
preferred more attention to have been paid to the value of being
able to give a legally enforceable commitment. Consider the case
of Webb v. McGowin,40 which Oman briefly discusses.41 In an incident at a workplace, Joe Webb saved his boss, J. Greeley McGowin,
from serious injury or death, by diverting a large falling block,
but in the process suffered severe injuries himself.42 McGowin
subsequently promised to pay Webb a certain amount every two
weeks until Webb died.43 McGowin did so until his own death, but
then McGowin’s executors ceased the payments.44 Webb sued, and
ultimately prevailed.45 However, the court had to go through
some analytical gymnastics to get to its result: comparing the
outcome to restitutionary recovery for rescued livestock, and applying a presumption that McGowin’s post-accident promise to pay
Webb “rais[e] the presumption that the services had been rendered
Id. at 11–12.
See id. at 10–11 (discussing the work of Daniel Markovits).
37 Id. at 15.
38 Id. at 5–8.
39 Id. at 8.
40 168 So. 196, 196 (Ala. App. 1936).
41 OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 108.
42 Webb, 168 So. at 197.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 197.
45 Id. at 199.
35
36
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at McGowin’s request”46—that is, a presumption that McGowin
somehow negotiated the payment for the rescue while the large
block was falling.47 This is obviously factually absurd, but perhaps
a paradigmatic use of a legal fiction48 to get the court to where it
wanted to go: enforcement of the promise despite the failure to meet
the consideration requirement (consideration will enforce a promise
given in exchange for a future action, but not a promise given in
response to a past action).49
Oman states that the promise in Webb was rightly enforced,
“because it was made in the context of a healthy market, and its
enforcement will serve to strengthen the trust within that market.”50 It is true that the saving of the life occurred between an
employee and an employer, but it was hardly the normal commercial aspects of the employment relationship.51 The trust that
was being increased was the trust that a promise made by a
beneficiary would be kept.52
The beneficiary of the altruistic act kept the promise
throughout his lifetime; the problem came only after his death,
when the executor of the estate refused to continue the payments.53
On this matter (and this is a sentence I did not foresee ever having to use), Richard Posner’s analysis is better than Oman’s. Posner
writes, regarding Webb:
The rescued person promised to pay his rescuer $15 every two
weeks for the rest of the rescuer’s life. This was a generous gift
to the extent that the promise was enforceable but a much less
generous one to the extent that it was not. Had the promisor
believed that such a promise was unenforceable, he might have
decided instead to make a one-time transfer that might have
had a much lower present value than had the annuity which
he in fact promised. Both parties would have been worse off
Id. at 198.
See id. at 198.
48 See generally LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967).
49 Steve Thel & Edward Yorio, The Promissory Basis of Past Consideration,
78 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1050 (1992) (“As is so often said, past consideration is no
consideration.”).
50 OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 108.
51 See Webb, 168 So. at 196.
52 See OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 108.
53 Id.
46
47
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by this alternative. Hence, it is not surprising that the court
held the promise to be enforceable.54

One possible objection to the outcome in Webb55 is that
enforcing promises of this sort requires an exception to (or, if one
prefers, a supplement to) the requirement of consideration. This
objection need not detain us long, for two reasons.56 First, current doctrine has already established an exception for cases of this
sort, and it is widely accepted.57 Second, Oman himself argues for
creating exceptions to the consideration requirement where it
serves the larger purpose (in his view, supporting markets).58
In the same chapter as the discussion of Webb, Oman defends the enforcement of promises for pensions (regardless of
reliance), on the grounds that such promises are “in a commercial
context in furtherance of economic activity.”59 Certainly, a pension for a worker is more clearly a “commercial context”60 than is
compensation for a good deed occurring during a workplace accident,61 but when the payment is made after the employment is
over (rather than as part of the initial employment package, or
as an incentive to get an employee to retire early), it looks more
like an act of altruism or the response to a moral obligation.
Oman is emphatic in rejecting the position proffered here
(or something like it): “[w]e should not enforce contracts simply
because people desire to impose legal obligations on themselves
and a respect for personal autonomy requires that we accede to
their wishes.”62 Throughout Oman’s extended discussion, it is
not clear why we should not.63 We are told, persuasively, that a
valuable use of Contract Law is the support of (good) markets.64
We are told, reasonably, though perhaps not (yet) indubitably,
Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 411, 419 (1977).
55 See Webb, 168 So. at 198.
56 See infra text accompanying notes 56–58.
57 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
58 OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 102–03.
59 Id. at 106.
60 Id.
61 See Webb, 168 So. at 198.
62 OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 180.
63 See infra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
64 OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 16.
54
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that this is the most important or most central use of or value
for Contract Law.65 Even granting both claims, it is not clear why
Contract Law should not also serve the purpose of allowing individuals to make legally enforceable commitments, even if those commitments are not directly connected to well-functioning markets.
Perhaps the concern is that if Contract Law tries to serve
the interests individuals might have outside the commercial context, it will undermine the force or effectiveness of the doctrinal
area’s service of well-functioning markets. There is some plausibility to this, in that resources or attention taken away from supporting markets might dilute the message and confuse contracting
parties.66 There might, of course, also be the occasional case where
the interest in supporting well-functioning markets (and not
supporting pathological markets) conflicts with the interest of
individuals in being able to impose legally enforceable obligations on themselves.67
Oman’s response to another canonical case, Hamer v.
Sidway,68 may be instructive here. Hamer is the case where the
uncle promised to pay his nephew a large sum of money if the
nephew gave up a bunch of fun (immoral) activities for a period
of time.69 At trial, the objection to enforcement had been that the
nephew had not provided consideration, because in giving up those
activities he was benefitting himself.70 The court, rejecting this argument, held that any giving up of a legal liberty was sufficient for
consideration; there was no need to show an objective detriment.71
Oman discusses this case in the context of his proposed
rule that “the law should presumptively enforce all agreements
made in furtherance of commercial activity.”72 He concludes that
though the agreement was “not made in furtherance of a commercial transaction and was not made in an established market,”
See id.
See supra text accompanying notes 62–65.
67 See generally Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005)
(involving the validity of an arbitration agreement between a credit cardholder
and a bank).
68 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
69 Id. at 256.
70 Id. at 257.
71 Id. at 259.
72 OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 102.
65
66
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it should be enforced, because it was a bargain (exchange), and enforcing exchanges might “assist in the generation of new markets.”73
Now, it is true that there might be an emerging market in
payments for self-deprivation—though, on the whole, it is not likely.
It is also true that allowing parties to make legally enforceable
commitments can be valuable, including for uncles who want to
give nephews incentives to change their ways (incentives that will
be significantly greater if they can be enforced in court).74 However,
it is equally true—and a simpler point—that both parties benefit in
such cases from an ability to make legally enforceable agreements.
C. Variety of and Within Contract Law
Oman’s approach places commerce front and center. Promises and agreements related to markets are to be enforced, unless the market is pathological.75 Agreements not clearly connected
to well-functioning markets are also to be enforced, but apparently
only because enforcement might help to develop new well-functioning markets.76 While I have no objection to an extra focus on
markets, and special rules to help to support them, I do have
qualms, as already noted, about the express and implied message
that promises and agreements unrelated to markets are of no
value (beyond their connection to possible future markets) and
should not be enforced.
One might wonder whether the single focus, or single fixation, of the Commerce Theory may be partly a product of the
distinctive way American Contract Law operates. In many other
jurisdictions and contexts, as well as much scholarly commentary,
Contract Law is divided up according to the parties involved.77
Id. at 103.
See Hamer, 27 N.E. at 256.
75 See generally OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1. Oman is not the first to this
prescription. Cohen describes Roscoe Pound as similarly arguing that “all promises
in the course of business should be enforced.” Cohen, supra note 3, at 573 (citing
ROSCOE POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 236, 276 (1922)).
76 OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 103.
77 Martijn W. Hesselink, Towards a Sharp Distinction Between B2B and
B2C?: On Consumer, Commercial and General Contract Law After the Consumer
Rights Directive 9–10 (Ctr. for Study of Eur. Contract L., Working Paper Series
No. 2009/06, 2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1416126
[https://perma.cc/8A39-4XN6].
73
74
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For European Contract Law, business-to-consumer (B2C) transactions are subject to different rules and principles than business-to-business (B2B) transactions.78 American law does have
some statutory protections for consumers, but these tend to be
marginal in their effects, and it is significant that such laws are
generally not discussed at length in Contract Law courses (or in
the Restatements of Contract Law).79
The primary law for international sale of goods, the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods (CISG, or Vienna Convention), does not apply to B2C transactions at all.80 By contrast, Article 2 of the American Uniform
Commercial Code applies whether the sale of goods is B2B or
B2C81 (though there are some provisions that apply in different
ways if one or both parties are merchants).82
On the scholarly side, Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott
published an influential article suggesting the B2B contracts should
be interpreted under different principles than non-B2B contracts
(a more textualist approach for B2B). Schwartz and Scott suggest B2B contracts should be treated differently in part because
of the different levels of sophistication when both parties are businesspeople, and in part because of the lesser concern for “autonomy”
interests when the parties are both businesses.83
There are a number of different axes along which one might
emphasize the variety within Contract Law: whether by the nature
of the parties (B2B, B2C, and where both parties are not business
entities), the general nature of the transaction (e.g., the way American law has distinctly different rule systems for sale of goods as
against non-sale of goods (services)), the transaction types (e.g.,
lease, employment contract, insurance, sale of real estate, mortgage,
Id.
See generally Stewart Macaulay, Bambi Meets Godzilla: Reflections on
Contracts Scholarship and Teaching vs. State Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Statutes, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 575 (1989) (discussing the lack of attention to consumer protection statutes in the contract law
literature and the modest effect of such statutes in practice).
80 Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG),
Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 art. 2(a).
81 U.C.C. § 2-102 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
82 See, e.g., id. § 2-205 (regarding firm offers); § 2-207(b) (relating to battle
of the forms).
83 Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 544–45, 556 (2003).
78
79
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etc.—all of which have some distinctive rules or principles),84 and
whether the agreement should be understood as “relational” or
“short-term”/“one-shot.”85 Not all legal systems make all of these
distinctions, or have rules and principles that vary significantly
across each of these dividing lines, but all the legal systems and
codes with which I am aware make many such distinctions.86
One question the variety of types, rules, and principles
within Contract Law raises is the tenability or wisdom of universal
theories for this area.87 That is not the topic here. The related theme
relevant here is the idea that Contract Law has many facets, a
fact that in turn makes it easier, perhaps, to recognize that it serves
multiple interests, and different values (which may often overlap,
but occasionally conflict).
I do not mean such references as opposition to or rebuttal
of Oman’s position. To the contrary, they are meant to be supportive, to be a friendly amendment.88 Consider an example, what
is likely one of the more controversial parts of the book’s argument.89 Oman offers a provocative response in The Dignity of
Commerce to the problem of boilerplate terms in standard form
and online contracts.90 Many commentators and some courts have
worried about the absence of meaningful consent by consumers and
employees to terms in their agreements.91 While most courts
ultimately enforce these provisions, despite concerns about consent,92 there is a steady stream of courts refusing enforcement.93
See generally KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DEAPPEALS 121–57 (Little, Brown & Co., 1960) (discussing a variety of
transaction types).
85 Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical
Judicial Error, 94 NW. U.L. REV. 749, 757–58 (2000).
86 See, e.g., Jan M. Smits, Law Making in the European Union: On Globalization and Contract Law in Divergent Legal Cultures, 67 LA. L. REV. 1181,
1182, 1184 (2007).
87 See Brian H. Bix, The Promise and Problems of Universal, General Theories of Contract Law, 30 RATIO JURIS 391 (2017).
88 OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 90.
89 Id. at 156.
90 Id.
91 See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity
and the Waning of Consent, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1231 (2006).
92 See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594 (1991)
(enforcing terms from a form contract).
93 See, e.g., Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless, 379 F.3d 159
(5th Cir. 2004) (holding a boilerplate arbitration clause to be unconscionable).
84

CIDING
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Under Oman’s analysis, minimal consent (one party providing terms to the second in some form or another, and the second
party’s having expressed assent in some form) is a sufficient
safeguard for most purposes, and the court’s being on guard against
“pathological markets” should be a sufficient supplement.94 Expecting or demanding consent in any more robust form is unrealistic, and when the objective of Contract Law is the support of
well-functioning markets, a focus on consent is simply misplaced.95
The implied cost-benefit calculation regarding the required
level of consent is likely correct for transactions between businesses and consumers and between businesses and employees.96
However, it is less clear that consent need be ignored or discounted
in contexts where mass production of forms is less common, as in
non-commercial agreements, or even in agreements between sophisticated business parties.97 This option might be more salient
in a less monistic theory, one more attentive to the variety of
contexts, uses, and objectives of agreements and promises.98
D. Oman and Cohen
There is a sense in which the approach in Oman’s book
can be seen as a development of the basic idea of Cohen’s article.99
Oman accepts that Contract Law should serve the best interests
of society, and believes that the best way (and the most natural
way) for this to happen is by tying the rules of enforcement, performance, and remedies to the service of encouraging well-functioning markets.100 On the whole, Oman is significantly more skeptical
OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 33–59.
Id. at 17.
96 I made a similar argument in Brian H. Bix, Contracts, in THE ETHICS OF
CONSENT 251, 264–65 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., Oxford, 2010).
97 Though with business-to-business agreements, the concern may end up
being terms that neither party understood, because they are standard provisions mindlessly repeated whose original meaning has been lost long before.
See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem
in Commercial Boilerplate 8 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 16-40, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2835681 [https://perma.cc/9486-8TA9].
98 See, e.g., OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 35.
99 OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 16.
100 Id.
94
95
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of government regulation than Cohen had been, though he is more
open-minded on the topic than the business groups Cohen criticizes in his work.101 By a focus on supporting well-functioning
markets, and avoiding any support of pathological markets, Oman
gives clearer normative guidance as to how to clarify some vague
standards in Contract Law, and where some rules should probably
be changed.102 As has been discussed, there remain places where
one might question Oman’s prescriptions, and there are also reasons for preferring a more pluralistic understanding of Contract
Law’s role.103 Still, Oman’s work can easily be seen as one that
takes Cohen’s view seriously, and tries to offer a distinct version of
what it would mean for Contract Law to serve the common good.104
CONCLUSION
Nathan Oman rightly comments, early and often in The
Dignity of Commerce, that it is surprising that his seems to be
the first theory of Contract Law that is centered on the market.105 Yet, if Oman’s approach is novel—and the novelty itself is
indeed noteworthy, as the book’s approach emphasizes what should
have been obvious to us long ago—there are still some predecessors to be found in earlier works.106 This is to be expected; scholarship is rarely entirely new (in many areas of philosophy, it is
commonly claimed that any allegedly new idea can in fact be
found in some form in Plato, Aristotle, or Aquinas).107 Oman
himself notes some predecessors among the American legal realists,108 and Morris Cohen was of that era, and his work reflects
its influence.109
Id. at 82, 138; Cohen, supra note 3, at 564–65.
OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 100.
103 See supra text accompanying notes 77–87.
104 OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 15.
105 Id. at 8 (“The link between contract law and markets is so palpable ... that
the relative absence of markets and commerce as a topic of moral theorizing
in contemporary contract law theory is striking.”).
106 Id. at 13–15.
107 See generally ABRAHAM EDEL, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PHILOSOPHY (2017).
108 See OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 13–15.
109 In other published work, Cohen was (like Lon Fuller) a friendly critic of
the movement. See, e.g., MORRIS COHEN, AMERICAN THOUGHT: A CRITICAL SKETCH
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Just as a connection between Contract Law and markets is
straightforward, yet perhaps ignored because it is so obvious,
Morris Cohen’s connection in his earlier article between Contract
Law and the public interest seems equally obvious, and perhaps
ignored in a similar way because of its salience.110 Oman’s work
brings back Cohen’s basic insight, and gives it a more concrete form
as a formidable normative theory, with detailed prescriptions. 111
Even if one does not agree with all aspects of the approach, it is
clearly an important step forward.

158–80 (1954); Cohen’s son, Felix Cohen, was himself an important legal
realist. See generally Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935).
110 See OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 15; Cohen, supra note 3, at 562.
111 See OMAN, DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 1.

